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Abstract Smart devices such as smartphones and tablets are used extensively in pub-
lic spaces for the transmission and reception of content in the form of text, photos
and streaming videos. Since the bandwidth provided for wireless access is limited
in public areas, it becomes an issue for users to gain access to the bandwidth they
need at the right times. While an omniscient controller could assign bandwidth to
each device on the basis of their needs and overall availability, imperfect informa-
tion about the instantaneous state of the wifi access patterns and needs of users make
for a very inefficient allocation of such bandwidth. This paper provides a solution
for bandwidth allocation by creating a market among users of smart devices so that
they can bid for extra bandwidth when they need it and sell it when they don’t.
They do so by using a virtual currency that is conserved so that each device owner
maximizes his own utility. This utility function is composed of both the benefit
accrued from accessing bandwidth and the loss of the currency incurred in bidding for
such bandwidth. Extensive simulations show that this market-based method outper-
forms an omniscient model when demand is uncertain, while minimizing bandwidth
consumption.
Keywords Bandwidth allocation · Trading market · Virtual currency · Economic
models
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1 Introduction
The advent of smart devices has resulted in unprecedented usage of wifi networks
to transmit media content. At the recent Superbowl 20161, for example, there were
20,300 maximum concurrent Wi-Fi users at a particular time, and more than 3
gigabits of data per second were carried over the wireless network for four contin-
uous hours. In many public locations such as airports, hotels, stadiums and malls,
the amount of bandwidth allocated is becoming constrained due to massive usage
demands and the popularity of photo, video and audio streaming apps like Netflix,
YouTube, Pandora, Spotify, Instagram and Vine. The hospitality industry has identified
this issue and is struggling to offer wifi services that can sustain this demand.2
Two possible solutions can mitigate this problem. First, one can augment the
amount of available bandwidth by installing increasing numbers of access points,
which has the drawback of being costly to the providers and result in over provi-
sioning when user needs fluctuate over time. Second, one can operate with existing
installed levels of bandwidth, but provide smart allocations by taking into account
the varying needs of the user. While this solution is economically desirable, there
remains the problem of dealing with the fluctuating needs of users. In most real-world
settings, it is hard to predict demand at an individual device level. Hence an omni-
scient bandwidth allocation system controller that needs to know user requirements
cannot be efficient in such settings.
In this paper we propose a market-based method for resource allocation in a dis-
tributed public setting. Rather than having a central controller to allocate bandwidth,
we design the system to work on a peer-to-peer level with each device owner bid-
ding for extra bandwidth based on his or her requirements. The market also provides
incentives to those owners that are not currently using the bandwidth to sell their
quota to others who need it. The resulting system is not only extremely adaptable
to unforeseen changes in the data or network failures, but it also makes the overall
capacity of the system far lower than in the over-provisioned scenario.
The market transactions are performed using a virtual currency. Each customer
is provided an initial budget and a basic bandwidth allocation. If a user wishes to
acquire more bandwidth for a certain time interval he can bid using her conserved
currency. Other users that are not using their bandwidth can thus sell it for given inter-
vals of time to the buyers and gain currency which can be used later for either buying
more bandwidth or obtain discounts at the public place. Each user maximizes his util-
ity function, which takes into account the gain he accrues from the extra bandwidth
and the loss incurred in buying bandwidth. In real-world scenarios users can be also
entitled to rewards such as hotel points or airline miles based on their transactions in
the market.
Finally, we conduct experiments to compare the market-based method with a cen-
tralized allocation method. We simulate both scenarios and examine the performance
1http://www.geekwire.com/2016/super-bowl-data-usage
2http://hotelexecutive.com/business review/3046/hotel-wi-fi-balancing-budget-bandwidth
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in transmitting data under various constraints. We observe that the market provides
significant benefits when there is uncertain demand for bandwidth, a situation which
is representative of many real-world scenarios.
2 Related work
Market mechanisms have been applied with great success in various resource allo-
cation applications such as networks, computer system resources, manufacturing
etc. [1]. Waldspurger et al. [12] developed a market-based computational system
called Spawn for trading idle computational resources in a distributed network of
heterogeneous computer workstations. Lai et al. [6] developed Tycoon, another
market-based resource allocation system that allowed for users to differentiate the
values of their jobs without manual bidding overhead. Mechanical structures and
their patterns can also be controlled and stabilized by market-based algorithms, as
shown by Guenther et al. [3] and Lynch and Law [7]. Last but not least there is the
work on market-based control mechanisms for electric power demand response, as
exemplified by Papavasiliou et al. [8].
There is also work on auction-based control of energy resources in a building [5],
of spectrum sharing [4] and of traffic lights [2], which points to the utility of markets
for decentralized control of many diverse resources.
There has been some work on markets in the context for bandwidth but not for
public space trading. For example, Rasmusson and Aurell [11] proposed a model of
price dynamics in bandwidth markets and studied how prices equilibrate under many
different conditions. Wang et al. [13] developed a market-driven approach to regulate
the behavior of selfish nodes that provide or consume services. However, their focus
is on reinforcement learning to help selfish nodes to incrementally adapt to the local
market, and to make optimized strategic decisions based on past experiences. Our
focus is on the design of a marketplace for public spaces where users can trade band-
width. Paris et al. [9] discuss a market where mobile operators can lease bandwidth
from third parties through their access points to increase network capacity. Qiu and
Marbach [10] develop a price-based approach to stimulate users to relay data packets
for other users.
3 The bidpacket market
In this market there are N consumers that are allocated a given amount of bandwidth
by a central wifi provider. In a real-world scenario this could be users in a hotel, an
airplane, a train, or an airport lounge that are sharing a wifi hotspot.
Apart from the initial allocation of bandwidth, all users are also awarded a budget
of virtual currency. This could be done fairly with all users getting the same amount
or with certain elite users being awarded more. If the initial bandwidth allocation
satisfies the need of the users they start using the bandwidth. At any point in time, if
any user wishes to acquire additional bandwidth he can bid to buy more, while users
who are not utilizing their quota can decide to sell their bandwidth to others.
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Thus all the profit that sellers get from selling bandwidth can be redistributed to
the other consumers when they in turn buy bandwidth. This implies that the total
amount of currency and resources in the system will stay constant. In our context,
this is the total amount of bandwidth that the producer allocates to the consumers (or
money associated with its use).
We assume that the market reaches equilibrium between overall supply and
demand, and this equilibrium determines the price and the amount of bandwidth
traded. Each consumer gets the amount of bandwidth that he offers to buy for the
equilibrium price and uses the bandwidth to consume/upload content in his device
for a specified duration.
3.1 Utility functions for buyers and sellers
Each consumer as a buyer i buys an amount of bandwidth, Bi , that depends on his
utility function, Ui which reflects a tradeoff between the bandwidth he consumes and
the loss of wealth involved. There are many utility functions that could be employed
for this purpose. A simple one expressed in terms of the price, p and a user i’s wealth
wi is given as :




where bi is a weight that can be modulated to determine the need to purchase for user
i.
The buyer demand function is obtained by maximizing his utility function as a
function of the bandwidth, which gives wi
p
bi .
This demand function causes the consumer to demand more bandwidth when his
needs are large (bi is large). It also reflects the trade-off involved in maintaining
wealth: demand decreases both with increasing price as well as when consumers have







Similarly, each user as seller tries to maximize his profit, ρ, given by the difference
between his revenue from selling bandwidth and his personal cost C(B).
ρ = pB − C(B) (3)
To minimize the total bandwidth used, we select a cost function for which the cost
per unit of bandwidth, C(B)
B
, increases with the amount of bandwidth sold.
A simple example of such a cost function is C(B) = B22ai where the parameter ai
reflects the importance of conserving bandwidth and using it for user i.
We obtain the producers supply function by maximizing its profit:
dρ
dB
= p − dC
dB
= 0 (4)
which implies Bsupply(p) = aip.
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From this, the price and amount of traded bandwidh is determined by the point
where the overall supply and demand curves intersect, i.e., Bsupply = Bdemand .
For our choices of the utility and cost functions, this condition can be solved







One of the issues in deploying markets is providing incentives for users to sell unused
bandwidth to those who need it. In the BidPacket market this is done through the
use of a virtual currency. Each user is originally awarded a budget. Users attempt to
conserve or gain virtual currency in order to obtain rewards from the market makers.
Real-world rewards can be in the form of loyalty points in hotels or airline miles.
4 Implementation of the market
The market is designed to operate in public spaces such as hotels, airports, resorts,
airplanes, etc. using the installed wifi allocation strategies. It can be implemented as
a built-in application that manages the market of users and thus it will not impact
the underlying layers of the wireless network. Each market will be associated with a
wifi hotspot or access point, so that users can only trade with other users using that
particular wifi access point.
Each user connects to an app on their smart device that can then be used to buy
or sell bandwidth. When a user registers at an access point, he is awarded a budget
of virtual currency. The list of users and their currency is maintained at the access
point level. Note that the budget is allocated only the first time a user registers using
the app with an access point. Depending on the use case, a user’s budget can be
associated either with only one access point or carried over across different access
points. In a hotel for instance, a user would tend to use wifi in their rooms rather than
the corridors whereas in an airport, users who move across lounges or from lounge to
gate can carry over their identity and currency to other access points. Since the user
connects through an app on any smart device that he owns, the identity of the user
and the available currency can be maintained across devices.
Bids entered in the system are displayed to other users who are registered. These
users can then decide to sell their quota of bandwidth if they are not planning to use
it. There is also a time window that is associated with each bid indicating how long
the user requires the excess wifi. We use hours as the unit of time that users can bid
for or sell. For instance, a user may desire to use higher bandwidth for 2 hours to
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watch a streaming movie. It may be possible for users who are not fulfilling their
purchased bandwidth to return or resell some of the bandwidth to other users.
Note that there is some wifi that is always present for a user. This enables the user
to transact in the market while also providing functionality for simple low-bandwidth
tasks like instant messaging and email. Also if a user is not using bandwidth and is
not participating in the market (selling), the bandwidth is redistributed to all the users in
the system. This way there is no wastage of bandwidth due to allocation to inactive users.
Having the market at the level of access points also allows the scalability to be
defined by the wifi provider. Thus the market does not need to worry about having
too many users transacting. It can only allow users who are registered at the access
point to trade the wifi. Also the users themselves do not have access to the currency
mechanism so there is no possibility of any modifications by users directly.
5 Experiments
To validate our assumption that markets can improve efficiency of bandwidth sharing,
we simulated a market for bandwidth allocation for a set of N users. We assume an
overall bandwidth B which is initially partitioned evenly across the devices. Note
that this allocation can also be done unfairly with some owners of devices enjoying
higher priorities or access privileges. Each user is also endowed with an initial budget
of currency C which will be used for trading purposes. In the simplest scenario, we
assume that this initial budget is equal for each user, although for other scenarios this
assumption may be relaxed.
At each instant of time, a user chooses to send a file based on a certain probability,
which we assume to derive from a uniform distribution. For the purposes of this
simulation we assume the file to be a video file which is then modeled as a Gaussian
with mean 150 and standard deviation 50.
If the device decides to send the file at that time instant, it has the option of
using the default bandwidth it has been originally assigned (B/N ) or purchasing
more bandwidth for a certain amount of time in order to send or receive the file at
a faster rate. This decision to purchase extra bandwidth is based on a utility func-
tion as described earlier. To simulate this utility we use two variables - one modeling
the urgency (as a uniform distribution) and the other taking into account the rela-
tive wealth (budget) that the device possesses. For instance, if the device is low on
currency, it is less likely to purchase bandwidth than if it was wealthy.
If the device chooses to purchase bandwidth, it registers a bid with a corresponding
price and a time. The price is calculated to be proportional to the size of the file the
device wants to send and its urgency requirement.
Other users who are not sending files can choose to sell their bandwidth and get
compensated in the form of currency. Each seller picks the buyer who is offering the
highest price among all the bids. Once a sale happens, the seller then relinquishes
their bandwidth to the buyer for the duration of the data transfer. The decision to sell
is also dependent on the budget possessed by the users, with users having low budget
more inclined to sell bandwidth to gain more wealth than others. The buyers can then
receive or transmit their data at a higher bitrate and receive a quicker transfer. If a
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Fig. 1 Total Data Transmitted with varying budgets
buyer does not find a seller, he has no option but to receive or transmit at its default
bitrate.
A buyer can also decide to purchase bandwidth from multiple devices. In this
case, more than one seller provide their bandwidth to a single device. This is useful
when very high priority data has to be transmitted since this operation will be more
expensive than the 1-1 transactions.
We conducted experiments varying the bandwidth allocated B, the number of
devices N and different budgets of currency C. As a baseline we use a non-market
scenario which is when devices cannot purchase extra bandwidth and must use what
is allocated. To measure efficiency we use the amount of data transmitted (measured
in bytes) over the entire simulation. The number of iterations (time) we use is 1000.
5.1 Varying budget
First we conduct experiments varying the initial budget C that is available to use for
the devices. We varied C as 50, 100, 200 and 500. The number of devices was kept
constant at 10000. Figure 1 provides the results for both 100 and 1000 iterations.
The results demonstrate that the market scenarios outperform the baseline allocation
significantly with increased data transmitted as the budget is raised. This is easy
to understand as the increased budget will provide more opportunities to purchase
bandwidth. The baseline system does not use a budget and relies on users to transmit
using the allocated bandwidth only.
5.2 Varying total bandwidth available
Next we vary the initial bandwidth B made available to the devices as 1000, 2000,
5000, 10000 and 20000. We observe (as shown in Fig. 2) that even in scenarios where
the overall bandwidth is really low, the market allocation strategy outperforms the
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Fig. 2 Total Data Transmitted with varying total bandwidth
baseline significantly. The number of users was kept constant at 10000 and the initial
budget at 100 for this experiment.
5.3 Varying number of user devices
Finally, we vary the number of user devices in the simulation over 1000, 2000, 5000,
10000 and 20000. In each case the initial budget C was maintained at 100 and the
initial bandwidth was kept at 10000. The results, as shown in Fig. 3 show that the
Fig. 3 Total Data Transmitted with varying number of user devices
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Fig. 4 Total Data Transmitted with small file sizes
data transmitted increases with the number of devices. This is due to the fact that as
the number increases more devices are likely to sell bandwidth. On the other hand,
and equally important, the baseline does not increase much because the number of
devices is increased.
5.4 Varying file sizes
We also varied the size of the files. Earlier experiments are with large files simulating
video streams. We also conducted an experiment with small files represented as a
Gaussian with mean 1.9 and standard deviation 0.5. The results are shown in Fig. 4
and again we find the market method providing significant improvements in data
transfer.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented BidPacket, a market for trading bandwidth in public
spaces. The market is simple to run and can operate above existing network protocols.
Our experiments have shown that having such a trading market can significantly
improve efficiency and provide a high rate of data transmission even in scenarios with
low overall values of provisioned bandwidth or increased numbers of users. Thus
Bidpacket can provide savings by reducing the amount of wifi they need to provision
in public spaces such as hotel lobbies, airport terminals or trains.
The market also allows users to gain virtual currency for sharing their bandwidth.
These earnings can be traded or substituted for real-world rewards such as hotel
loyalty points, airline miles or coupons for products.
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Note that in the market mechanism described in this paper, we have used absolute
values of required bandwidth. In a deployment scenario, a simpler setting could offer
two levels of bandwidth access - standard and elite with users having the option of
purchasing the higher level through trading with other customers.
Finally we point out that while in this paper we described the market as being used
by individual users, in industrial settings it can be easily translated to wifi-enabled
industrial devices such as sensors that need to transmit readings while conserving
their resources such as power. These smart sensors can be easily programmed to bid
for the necessary bandwidth when needed, and use their utility functions to request
those required resources with the right amount of currency.
In future work, we plan to investigate a number of interesting scenarios, such as
collusion among users, hoarding of resources for future use, and even handoffs from
licensed spectrum to wifi.
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